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FOREWORD
The United States Military Academy (USMA) Senior Conference is run annually by the Department of
Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy
on behalf of the Superintendent. This event allows
distinguished representatives from the private sector,
government, academia, the think-tank community,
and the joint military services to discuss important
national security topics.
Senior Conference 2014, the 50th iteration of this
event, explored emerging trends and their implications for the Army’s strategic contribution to national
security. As policymakers strive to rebalance U.S. national security investments in a fiscally constrained
environment, debates about the future roles and missions of the armed services have intensified. Though
many questions related to the future role of military
power remain unsettled, the Army will undoubtedly
have an important role to play.
The conference consisted of five plenary sessions
and five keynote addresses. All presentations and subsequent discussions occurred on a not-for-attribution
basis to allow for free testing and expression of ideas.
Because of this, the summary report is motivated by
ideas offered during the event, but it does not attribute
these ideas to specific individuals or organizations.
This Conference Report was prepared under the direction of Colonel Jeffrey Peterson, the Academy Professor responsible for the coordination and execution
of the conference. It was edited by Major Charlie Lewis
and Dr. Rachel Sondheimer, who also coordinated the
team of expert rapporteurs, which included Dr. Steven
Bloom, Dr. Hugh Liebert, Major Bonnie Kovatch, Dr.
Rob Person, Dr. Thom Sherlock, and Mr. Richard Yon.
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Major Joe Da Silva served as the Executive Secretary of
Senior Conference 50 and deserves our many thanks
for the success of the event. The opinions expressed in
this report reflect the notes taken by the authors and
not necessarily the position of the United States Military Academy, the United States Army, or any other
government agency.
CINDY R. JEBB, Ph.D.
COLONEL, U.S. Army
Professor and Head,
Department of Social Sciences
United States Military Academy
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THE ARMY WE NEED:
The Role of Landpower in an Uncertain
Strategic Environment
The Army is facing difficult times. Many are questioning the Army’s relevance and size. The lack of political will for committing land forces is intertwined
with strategic challenges of fiscal austerity and rebalancing the national security focus toward the AsianPacific region. The Army’s strategic role is becoming
muddled in the midst of debates about the significance and responsibilities of each service within and
among the Department of Defense (DoD), the halls
of Congress, and the American public. In spite of the
questions and a murky national security strategy, the
Army continues to fight in Afghanistan, support training in the Asian-Pacific region, and deploy regionally
aligned forces to Africa. Each of these efforts demonstrates the Army’s value, but the Army struggles
to properly convey its worth to policymakers, Congresspersons, the American public, and—sadly—
even itself.
Senior Conference 50, “The Army We Need: The
Role of Landpower in an Uncertain Strategic Environment,” sought to illuminate the environment in which
the Army fights, and how the Army can provide the
most utility to the United States of America. Through
formal and informal discussions with over 70 participants from the Army, federal government, academia,
think tanks, and the private sector, the conference focused on defining the contributions of land forces to
national security and how to best provide Landpower
capabilities in the future.
Following 3 days of discussion, beginning with an
overview of the strategic environment and conclud1

ing with a discussion on shifting paradigms within
the Army, the conference concluded with a variety of
new ideas on the role of Landpower, a strategic message, and a structure to best maintain the Army’s central role in national strategy. This report consolidates
the key takeaways of the conference and provides
recommendations to policymakers and Army leadership on how to develop the Army we need over the
coming decades.
MOTIVATING THEMES AND QUESTIONS
Senior Conference 50 followed a year-long writing campaign on grand strategy by academics, Army
leadership, and policymakers. Resulting in a compendium released by the Strategic Studies Institute of the
U.S. Army War College, the campaign broadly examined the role of all services, agencies, and players in
forming a grand strategy for the United States. Taking the lessons learned from this effort and focusing
on the role of Landpower in the grand strategic context, Senior Conference 50 sought to outline and debate the role of the Army within the current strategic
environment.
Over the course of five keynote addresses, five panels, and myriad informal conversations among participants, the conference explored the central theme of
the future of Landpower using six guiding questions:
1. What are the most significant threats and opportunities in the emerging security environment that the
Army should be prepared to address?
2. What do transnational security challenges, such
as terrorism or conflict in cyberspace, imply about the
Army’s needed capabilities?
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3. What are the strategic capabilities and joint force
enablers provided by the Army? How should the
Army balance investments among these capabilities
and other elements of Army force structure?
4. What capabilities should the Army develop to
enhance the benefits of regional alignment?
5. How can the Army improve its integration with
other instruments of national power, as well as other
military services, host nations, allies, and international
organizations?
6. How should education and training, including
opportunities such as graduate school, interagency
fellowships, and other broadening experiences, prepare officers and soldiers to operate effectively in this
uncertain environment?
Several key themes emerged related to the external factors shaping the Army’s working environment,
the internal factors upon which the Army can act, and
three fundamental disconnects that create planning
challenges. The themes are outlined on the following
pages and the report concludes with recommendations
for consideration by key Army leadership and civilian
policymakers.
External Factors.
Factors beyond the Army’s control make strategic planning difficult, if not impossible. Budgets will
not get larger; partisan politics will not get resolved;
messaging to the American public will not get easier;
and the complexities of globalization will continue to
make the crafting of strategic guidance difficult. These
challenges are derived from a lack of consensus about
the strategic environment and a political context that
is not conducive to maintaining a large Army.
3

An Uncertain Strategic Environment.
The lack of consensus on the global security environment makes it difficult to formulate an agreedupon national security strategy that clearly establishes priorities among competing requirements and
articulates acceptable risk. Policymakers, academics,
and national security experts agree the strategic environment is complex and uncertain. They also provide
an extensive list of future threats that is wide ranging, inclusive, and generally accepted without debate.
However, consensus ends with the list itself.
Disagreements arise when the topic shifts to details including the likelihood and severity of various threats. Unfortunately, it is coming together on
these details that might enable the Army to prioritize
threats. Security experts do not have a great track record for predicting the timing, location, and severity
of future conflicts. Some argue that the next battlefield
will be in cyberspace or outer space. Others assert that
conflict will occur in urban terrain against unconventional forces in a failed state or entail some form of
proxy war. Moreover, the sources of future threats are
in dispute, with some pointing to challenges posed
by particular nations (e.g., China, Iran, and Russia),
while others focus on the notion of the “democratization of destruction,” in which small groups have an
increasing ability to wreak havoc on various populations. Some view the Pacific region, including the ever
present specter of a North Korean attack, as the largest
concern, while others consider the Middle East as the
primary source of national security threats. Still others point to the inherent risk of deemphasizing areas
outside of these two regions. This strategic ambiguity
will likely continue. Finally, strategy formulation will
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continue to be challenging as the United States accumulates, but fails to shed, additional risk. Absent a
unifying existential threat that focuses security efforts,
the Army will face continued volatility in its strategic
direction as partisan politics increasingly influence
security policy.
This lack of certainty in strategic priorities leads to
a lack of prioritized capabilities. Without clear direction for which national security threat to prepare, the
Army ends up with the ability to do a little bit of everything fairly well at the expense of doing one, or even
a few, things very well. In short, the Army becomes
the nation’s utility player and is expected to conduct
operations anywhere, anytime, against anyone. When
resources are abundant, the Army can manage this
role more effectively. When funding is scarce, tradeoffs occur and risks accumulate.
Without clear strategic guidance, decisions about
force size, structure, and readiness are informed by
factors other than capability requirements. Personnel
are cut simply because they are expensive, not because they are no longer needed. Budget allocations
are decided by acquisition programs that provide the
most jobs for the right congressional districts, not by
acquiring capabilities to meet the most likely or most
dangerous threats. Technology purchases are made to
fit the nation’s desired vision of future conflict by substituting materiel for people, not by seeking the right
technology to enable soldiers to fight in concert with
the true nature of modern warfare.
The Army’s precarious position of managing an
expanding threat portfolio with a decreasing budget
is exacerbated by budget allocation constraints largely
determined by factors unrelated to actual threats. As
a result, the United States is not only facing the risk
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of accumulating threats, it is also facing the risk of
accumulating capability shortfalls.
Political Context.
In addition to the uncertain strategic environment, the current political context further complicates the Army’s strategic decisionmaking process.
The seemingly perpetual campaign and election
cycle and the complexities of the current partisan terrain make it difficult to formulate and provide comprehensive strategic guidance. As the recent budget
impasse highlights, the Army also cannot rely on
efficient government operations.
The current political environment, coupled with
diminishing public support for boundless military intervention and use of conventional methods, should
be taken into account when thinking about the future
of Landpower. The Army must face up to the public’s exhaustion with financially supporting long-term
land wars that achieve ambiguous results. While the
American people support the military, that support
has financial limits. The lack of a clear enemy creates
a public and political climate that is increasingly riskaverse and will not accept the use of ground forces
in the absence of an existential threat. Moreover, the
domestic reality of the deep economic recession has
diminished much of the public’s willingness to devote federal spending to the military when it could
be spent on domestic programs. While these tradeoffs
are not as zero-sum as many believe, perception is as
important as reality. The United States will have the
Army for which its citizens are willing to pay.
While most would like strategic considerations to
drive budgetary decisions, it is increasingly evident
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that budgetary and political considerations will drive
strategic decisions. There are no indications in Congress that budget austerity for the Army will disappear. Allowing the budget to drive strategic decisions
leads to acceptance of large personnel cuts while the
Army fights to maintain its acquisition programs. The
reasons are straightforward: talented personnel in today’s all-volunteer force are expensive, and acquisition programs provide jobs. Personnel costs such as
compensation, health care, and pensions have taken
over an unsustainably high proportion of the Army’s
budget. Many hold the perspective that personnel
cuts will bring immediate savings, and the risk of a
smaller Army is mitigated by the nation’s ability to
expand or regenerate the Army in times of crisis. Others see shrinking budgets as less of a problem given
that today’s Army budget remains higher than historical precedent and that modern capabilities should
more than compensate for reduced numbers. Another
attractive aspect of personnel cuts is that remaining
dollars can be spent on materiel solutions. Acquisition programs bring more politically viable outcomes
such as increased employment, fighting from a distance, avoiding loss of soldiers, and ensuring short
duration conflict.
Conference participants felt that this lack of clear
strategic priorities along with a difficult political context impede the Army’s ability to arrive at sound strategic decisions. Unfortunately, there are no indications
the strategic planning environment will change. The
Army should accept the reality of becoming a smaller
force that the American public will be hesitant to use
in large numbers. There is a danger that America ends
up with the Army it can afford rather than the Army
it needs. Even so, the Army has a professional obliga-
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tion to narrow the gap between what the nation can
afford and what the nation requires. The Army should
focus on resolving internal debates about capability
mix, readiness levels, and productivity enhancement.
Once the Army reaches internal agreement, it can begin to shape itself and communicate a message that
articulates its value to both key decisionmakers and
the broader public.
Internal Factors.
Given the lack of consensus among those outside
the Army on the security environment and the nature
of future threats, it is not surprising that there is disagreement on these issues within the Army as well.
Even if we assume some agreement on the nature of
the threat, disagreement persists within the Army on
the role of the Army in preparing for the future. This
internal lack of consensus results in an identity crisis
that fuels disagreement among the Army, congressional leaders, policymakers, and the American public.
Regardless of external factors beyond the Army’s control, resolution of internal disagreements can improve
both the Army’s capabilities and the message it sends
to others. By embracing the need for institutional reforms and executing cultural change, the Army can
do much to mitigate the impact of the political context and what some participants perceived as a lack of
strategic guidance.
Readiness Portfolio.
One such locus of disagreement is how to maintain
appropriate levels of readiness. While there is agreement that educating, training, and equipping our forces is of utmost priority, there is little consensus on the
8

substantive nature of what it means to be ready. Do
we need a large, active duty Army? Will tiered readiness be sufficient when confronting future threats?
What is the role of readiness in achieving deterrence?
Regardless of the final decision on end strength,
which will be determined by the budget, the Army
should decide how to best manage a readiness portfolio that provides the right capability with appropriate
response time. There is disagreement within the Army
about some key future decisions. For example, recent
competition about the role of combat aviation assets
in the National Guard highlight increased conflict between the active component, the National Guard, and
the Army Reserve. After 13 years of fighting alongside
each other, the Total Army is beginning to compete
with each other over increasingly scarce resources.
More energy should be spent on aligning capabilities
and integrating training rather than on competing for
shrinking budgets. There is also significant debate
about tiered readiness. Some consider tiered readiness
as a necessary condition for allocating scarce training
dollars, while others are concerned that tiered readiness will create a divide between units that have sufficient resources to prepare and others that are unable
to achieve appropriate readiness levels for their mission. Disagreement on how to best produce readiness
hinders the Army’s ability to achieve readiness and
articulate a need for training resources.
The Army is also vigorously debating the appropriate missions for itself. Very few will debate the necessity of full-spectrum operations, but many disagree
about what part of the spectrum the Army should prioritize. The ongoing debate about the relative importance of high-intensity conflict and stabilization operations undermines the Army’s definition of readiness.
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Some experts emphasize the Army’s role as part of the
nation’s military power with an emphasis on the missions of deter, defend, attack, and pacify. Others focus
on capabilities such as rapid response, transition to
offensive operations, wide area security, and operating on multiple battlefields. Still others express concern that increased emphasis on shaping and building capacity at the expense of combat readiness will
undermine the Army’s ability to deter. These debates
are not easily resolved. However, failing to do so dilutes the Army’s impact on budget decisions because
it cannot clearly articulate what capability the Army
will provide as a return on investment. Acknowledging tradeoffs and clearly articulating risk can provide
the Army a starting point for mission focus. This
could prevent what one senior leader described as the
true definition of a hollow unit—a unit without a clear
mission and path to readiness.
Lack of clarity on required response times adds
complexity to the debate. Some argue that the increased “velocity” of conflict requires a “fight tonight” mentality with high levels of readiness across
the active force. Others argue that response times can
be longer, which leads to concepts of tiered readiness and more capability in the National Guard and
Army Reserve.
A final aspect of readiness that needs resolution is
the Army’s role in the joint force. Many conference participants commented that other services are retreating
from the joint force culture. Services are disengaging
from a joint culture as each tries to justify and increase
its respective budget allocation. The Army contributes many capabilities that are not considered core
requirements and that are unacknowledged and underappreciated. Operational concepts such as Air-Sea
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battle draw sharp lines between services and set the
stage for competition in acquisition programs and relevance. There are no easy solutions to this unfortunate
trend, but the Army could improve its own perspective by thinking outside the concept of Landpower
and considering the larger concept of military power.
Additionally, the Army should embrace its contribution to joint operations and seek improvement in integrating future concepts with other services. One small
example of improvement would be a better representation of other services at this conference.
Institutional Reforms.
The first and perhaps most obvious obstacle to institutional reform is the tendency for the Army’s bureaucratic culture to grow and entrench during times
of austerity. In the name of efficiency and accountability, bureaucratic procedures and culture tend to
choke out efforts to innovate. At a time when leaders espouse the need for flexibility, adaptability, and
innovation, the bureaucracy can exert itself in ways
that diminish these objectives. Examples of bureaucratic efficiency during the last decade of war, such as
mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle delivery, are heralded as evidence that our systems can
respond quickly. Unfortunately, these exceptions are
not the rule and require significant effort from senior
leaders to bypass inflexible, unresponsive systems.
Furthermore, these exceptions do not pave the way
for reform. Instead, the bureaucracy often finds a way
to further entrench itself and exert influence to protect
its domain. Clearly, an institution of the Army’s size
needs bureaucratic management systems. However, if
these systems become obstacles to flexibility instead
of enhancing flexibility, something ought to change.
11

One of the first areas that can stem the tide of
emerging recalcitrant bureaucracy is better integration
of the operational and generating forces. Rather than
two separate entities operating independently from
each other, efforts should be made to merge the operational and generating force whenever possible. Not
only would this reduce overhead, but there would be
better integration of the operational perspective in the
generating force. There are a range of questions the
Army should explore. For example, does the Army
need separate installations for initial entry training?
Are there ways to merge this training to operational
installations? Further consideration could be given to
the ideal ratio and partnerships of Active duty, Reserve duty, and National Guard troops that comprise
America’s Total Army. Training and resource sharing
could greatly enhance working relationships and increase training efficiency. Finally, a careful examination of the role of civilians is a crucial consideration
as the Army thinks through shifting down to a fielded
force of approximately 450,000 soldiers. What is the
optimal ratio of active military to civilians in the DoD
workforce?
The Army should also consider a paradigm shift
to talent management of human capital that fosters institutional agility. If the Army is to remain a capable,
but smaller force, it should change personnel policies to enhance the balance between productivity and
leader development. The Army needs diversity of talent, schooling, experiences, and skill sets to adapt to
changing threats and capacities, but it does not have
the granular data to reveal individual talents. One
participant offered that social networking sites such
as Facebook and LinkedIn know more about the talent in the officer corps than the Army itself. Research
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and pilot programs indicate that the Army is unaware
that talent and preferences are left unutilized because
of a personnel system that has remained largely unchanged since the 1950s.
In addition to this breadth of different types of officers, the Army needs depth of knowledge in specific
positions. This is particularly true for the institutional
management positions that make up the vast majority
of senior leader positions. While much can be said for
our rotational system creating breadth of knowledge
and experiences among the officer corps, it is likely
that these high rates of churn in top positions come at
the expense of subject mastery for the officer and deleterious behaviors for subordinates in the bureaucracy.
There is much shorter average tenure in place in the
Army than in corporate leadership. This undermines
responsibility and accountability in job performance,
as subordinates know they do not have to adapt to
change when they can simply wait out the next change
of leadership.
While talent management and adaptation in a
number of areas seems promising, the Army is not an
institution that quickly embraces institutional change.
Organizational behavior and psychological research
suggests that senior Army leaders are resistant to
change because of their personalities, intelligence
types, and initial career experiences. Officers come
into the profession of arms less open to change but
highly productive, with professional drive, strong intellect, and routinely strong moral values. The Army
then socializes them, imprints its values, and sends
them into first assignments where they get stretched,
then rewarded, resulting in a hardening of those imprints. They emerge as senior leaders, relatively homogeneous as a group by both nature and nurture.
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Because these leaders shape the Army’s culture, the
Army is slow to accept innovative, adaptive thinking
in an ever changing world. This conclusion does not
imply that senior leaders are incapable of leading institutional change, but there may be ways to increase
innovation by making senior leaders aware of status
quo bias and to surround senior leaders with people
who view the world differently.
Messaging and Narrative.
Conference participants exhibited remarkable
consensus that the Army does a poor job articulating
to Congress and the public its contributions to U.S.
national security and the hedge it provides against
a variety of threats. Throughout the conference, participants highlighted the Army’s need to improve its
message so that civilian leaders and the American
public better understand the need for Landpower
capabilities. The discussions highlighted disconnects
between civilian experts, congressional leaders, and
Army leaders concerning the Army’s contribution to
national security. Army leaders expressed frustration
that civilians did not have a clear understanding of
Landpower. Civilians expressed frustration that they
did not understand the Army’s message and that the
Army needed to improve the messaging strategy.
A common refrain throughout the conference was
that the Marine Corps does a much better job at messaging than the Army. One participant noted that the
Army’s message to Congress is that the Army cannot
do its mission with anything less than 490,000 soldiers,
while the Marine Corps offers that they will accomplish their mission with a handful of Marines armed
with plastic spoons. The Marines’ message resonates
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with Congress, while the Army’s does not. Surprisingly, there was very little response from the audience
about the veracity of the observation and the differences in messaging requirements. One could argue
that the Marine Corps’ message is clear and simple
because their mission is clear and simple. In contrast,
the Army’s mission is significantly more complex and
not easily reduced to simple phrases that appeal to
an audience that wants to hear that missions can be
accomplished with very few resources.
Despite agreement that there should be a better
message, there was little consensus among participants as to the best messaging strategy for describing Army contributions over the past 13 years or for
handling future budget cuts. Some argued that the
Army should give away nothing, fighting every cut,
while others argued that Army leaders need to recognize that downsizing is inevitable and that damage
must be limited through prudent compromise and
concession. Regardless of the path chosen to negotiate
future budget cuts, it is clear that the Army should
improve its messaging to those inside and outside of
government.
Fundamental Disconnects.
Technology: Substitute or Enabler.
The role of technology was frequently addressed
during most panel discussions and keynote speeches.
Some speakers extolled the benefits of technology,
while others were more cautious about what technology could accomplish. A consistent question in the
discussion about technology emerged: Is technology
primarily a substitute for soldiers or does it enable
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a soldier to accomplish the mission more effectively? The answer is not an either-or proposition, but
there should be a clear distinction between these two
purposes of technological innovation.
In the ongoing debate on technology versus personnel, technology seems to have the upper hand
among policymakers. This critically undervalues the
Army’s persistent strength—soldiers. Those in favor
of spending on technology argue that advances in cyber technology, precision engagement, and robotics
provide immense opportunities to address threats to
national security without having to commit soldiers
for extended, unpopular missions. They acknowledge that technology’s rapid speed of development
and commercialization pose serious challenges to the
Army’s acquisition system, but this does not minimize
the importance of acquiring the best technology possible. Without continued significant investment, our
lead in military technology will erode, and we will lose
this advantage in combat. Even the perception of technological erosion can have deleterious consequences.
In this rapidly changing technological environment,
the United States can no longer assume dominance.
Additionally, as these technologies commercialize,
they become much more difficult to control and more
accessible to our enemies, namely terrorist organizations and other nonstate actors.
While there is a widespread fear of falling behind
in cyber and technology research and development,
there is also a widespread belief that someday, the
Army will be “fighting in the dark” or “fighting unplugged.” There is an irony to these seemingly complementary beliefs in that one favors funding technology over personnel, while the other acknowledges
that technology will inevitably fail us when we need
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it. This can be offered as an argument for more focus
on technology, but it seems to speak to the need for
investment in soldiers. Leadership is critical to the Army’s success. This is the crux of the debate: should the
Army be investing in people or in technology? While
the easy answer is both, tradeoffs are inevitable, and
this is where the Army needs to maintain a clear message to the outside world: our strength is our soldiers.
Another key issue in determining the way ahead for
the Army in grappling with technology and personnel
is to define the cyber realm clearly. Specifically, which
defense or government entity claims cyberspace as its
terrain? In some ways, the Army is a logical locus for
control because cyber entails the interconnectedness
of the physical, social, and human terrains. However,
if the Army is thought of as controlling Landpower,
control of the cyber terrain is less certain.
The cyber world is in such a state of flux that it
is difficult, if not impossible, to predict what it will
look like just 5 years from now. The Army’s authority in cyber defense only extends to the .mil domain.
Integration of private, government, and military defenses in the cyber realm to enhance security as well
as research and development is needed, but the infrastructure for such collaboration does not yet exist.
Recent security breaches sparked debate concerning
the primacy of military duties and the public’s right
to privacy, impeding further discussion of integration
and coordination.
The debate about the importance and impact of
technology will likely continue indefinitely. However,
a nuanced approach to technology and the nation’s
technological advantage is critical to understanding
the full impact of technological investments. It is important to not fall prey to the idea that modern war
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can be won solely with precision targeting and technical dominance. Likewise, the Army should not shortchange technological investments that enable soldiers
to perform more effectively on today’s battlefield. The
answer to the technology question is that in some cases, technology may be a good substitute for soldiers,
but, in other cases, technology is an enabler for decisive victory achieved by soldiers. The Army should
find a way to strike this balance based on the nature
of war, technological advances available, impact
on end strength, and investments into research and
development.
Expanding the Army: How long does it take?
Civilian policymakers and analysts hold a widespread belief that the Army can easily expand when
faced with the next existential threat. This assumption is critical in the debate about personnel cuts. If
decisionmakers believe the Army can be expanded
quickly, they are more willing to make large personnel cuts. The assumption also provides the veneer of
prudent risk management for a smaller active force. If
the Army can quickly expand, the nation can accept
the risk of a small standing army that retains enough
capability to respond quickly, while also buying time
for the Army to expand if the threat exceeds the capability of the active force. Proponents of rapid expansion often point to the Army’s expansion for World
War II as an example for today’s Army. This belief
significantly changes the risk assessment of a smaller
active duty force.
While some participants argued that rapid expansion negated the risk of a smaller Army, several
countered the basic assumption that an Army can be
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trained and educated quickly. The Army cannot systematically dismantle and systematically rebuild itself
during times of necessity without risking substantial
losses in the early stages of the next war. The speed,
complexity, and scrutiny of modern warfare demands
professional soldiers and exceptionally well-trained
forces. The Army can no longer compensate for tactical
inexperience with firepower because the international
community condemns extensive collateral damage.
The inability to apply massive firepower will result in
higher casualties, an equally unacceptable outcome.
Americans underestimate the time required to train a
professional army that conducts modern warfare in a
way that not only accomplishes the mission, but does
so in a manner that represents our nation’s values. Assuming the Army can quickly achieve such high levels
of proficiency is a dangerous illusion of prudent risk
management that actually increases risk to international credibility and U.S. Soldiers.
Modern Warfare: Differing Definitions.
There is a dangerous divide about the nature of
war, the role of technology on the battlefield, and the
time required to develop a professional land force.
One side is searching for ways to save money by defining war in ways that support budget savings. The
other side is concerned the Army will pay the cost of
these savings with blood and potential mission failure. Both sides should work to find solutions that
reduce the budget while maintaining required capabilities for the real threats to national security. Clear
thinking and reasonable compromise will require
extraordinary effort.

19

RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Adopt a Cohesive Message: The Army is the
Nation’s Insurance. The Army should spend considerable energy adopting and disseminating a cohesive
Army message that explains the usefulness of Army
capabilities, clearly articulates tradeoffs, and strongly
emphasizes risks. The Army’s current message focuses on capabilities, which emphasizes products and
materiel. A message that focuses on risk management
emphasizes senior Army leaders as professional advisors providing input to civilian decisionmakers, a role
that is much more in line with the norms of the Army
profession.
The Army’s message on capabilities is pretty clear.
However, the message is not being received because
people do not want to commit Landpower in large
numbers or incur the cost of a large army. However,
emphasis on risks associated with various tradeoffs
might resonate more with the American public, particularly in light of recent conflicts around the globe.
Clear articulation of risks could focus internal planning and garner support from external players. The
Army should constantly outline the risks that are
managed by the Army and the risks that remain due
to limited resources. When the Army’s task is viewed
as providing insurance against various risks, the
purpose of Army messaging is to provide the nation
the knowledge it needs to make an informed decision about whether to maintain its current level of
prevention.
The difficulty in justifying military spending in
times of austerity is that defense is often viewed as
an inherently reactive enterprise. Simplistically, we
do not need the military until another nation (or non-
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state actor) goes on the offensive. Thought of in this
way, the Army is the nation’s insurance policy against
threats to the land and human terrain. Even though, as
a nation, we normally do not need it and are content
not to use it, the insurance is invaluable and irreplaceable under dire circumstances. The nation’s citizens,
as the policyholders, must decide how much coverage
they want and how much risk they are willing to accept, given their choices of funding Landpower as an
insurance policy. The nation can pay lower premiums
over time (lower defense spending) and accept the
tradeoff of a higher deductible when disaster strikes
(high casualty counts and longer lead times to build
up a strong fighting force). Alternatively, the nation
can opt to pay higher premiums (increased defense
spending) in an effort to deter conflict and decrease
our deductible when forced to fight.
Adopting this message does not offer a clear path
for the future of Landpower. Instead, the aim is to provide an analogy of the Army as an insurance policy
and risk mitigation system with the intent of spurring
an informed debate about important tradeoffs. Laying
out the debate over the future of Landpower in terms
of insurance allows for policymakers, practitioners,
and experts to make reasoned claims about the relative need and value of these respective investments
within policy circles and to the public at large.
2. Adopt a Cohesive Narrative: Understanding
Warfare. The defense establishment is enamored
with an idea that wars can be won from the sea, air,
and cyber domains, where the U.S. technological and
scientific advantages over other nations are most evident. This view is a resurrection of the revolution of
military affairs based on information dominance that

21

would provide perfect situational awareness and precision engagement that reduces warfare to a targeting
exercise. This is war as they would like it to be, not as
it exists. This belief somehow remains alive in spite of
the enduring nature of warfare reinforced by the most
recent 13 years of conflict. The land domain is more
central to war than other domains. Battles may extend
to the air and sea but, in the end, people live on land,
making it the most important terrain.
Moreover, war involves continued interaction
with smart enemies. It is a strategic game with enemies learning and adapting through repeated interactions. Every technological advance can be countered
by the enemy. For every armored vehicle, there exists
an improvised explosive device (IED) designed to destroy that vehicle. The key to success is creating forces
led by talented leaders who can react and adapt to the
velocity with which enemies will attack. Given this
constant need for adaptation, forces on the scene are
more valuable than forces on the horizon.
As Carl von Clausewitz famously stated, war is an
extension of politics through other means. As such,
consolidation and maintenance of gains are critical to
success and are an integral consideration of the planning process. Precision engagements that penetrate
defensive architectures and destroy targets are insufficient for decisive strategic results. Reassurance is as
important as deterrence in consolidating gains. We
cannot expect our American-trained foreign allies to
always operate in our best interests. Their values and
interests change in repeated interactions just as ours
do, which is why the nation cannot depend on other
armies to achieve our national interests. The Army is
the land-centric expression of U.S. foreign policy in
any region. Having soldiers in an area improves our
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understanding of the region, increases our ability to
respond to unforeseen events, and enhances our relationships with local partners. U.S. land forces cannot
effectively shape foreign environments unless they
are stationed abroad.
3. Debunk the Army Expansion Myth. As previously discussed, the Army faces large personnel
cuts driven by budget austerity because policymakers,
Congress, and the American public believe it is easier
to create a soldier than a piece of equipment. Prevailing wisdom seems to hold that a large Army can be
built fast in case of a major land conflict. Reversing
the drawdown, however, limits the velocity required
to win a major conflict with one of the three major
powers trying to change the status quo. The time to
build a force of minimal effectiveness is still time taken away from the first (and potentially the last) battle
with a near-peer adversary. Moreover, training and
educating soldiers and leaders takes time, as evident
by recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. More
than weapons, skills and tactics are needed to create a
strong Army. Trust takes years to create. There must
be trust in the skills of the soldier. Trust between soldiers and leaders must exist to provide the necessary
development to accomplish a mission. Finally, trust
between the American public and its Army requires
a strong understanding of the moral and ethical decisionmaking of the Army; this is something that takes
years, not weeks, to produce.
While we think of land forces as being able to be
dismantled and rebuilt without significant risk, this is
a myth. It takes more time to build an effective leader
of soldiers than to construct a ship or airplane. Planning under the assumption of an easily expandable
Army will lead to unnecessary casualties and collat23

eral damage. Both outcomes are unacceptable to the
American public.
4. Improve Dissemination of the Message and
Narrative. Even if the Army’s current message and
narrative become coherent and cohesive, the organization is not designed to disseminate the message effectively. The Air Force, the Marines, and the Navy
tend to dominate external messaging campaigns, generally leaving the Army to face the brunt of personnel
and equipment cuts. To improve dissemination of its
message, the Army should improve the education and
training of its officers and allow officers longer tours
in Washington, DC, which would help nurture relationships with members of Congress and the congressional staff. The other services, especially the Marines,
liaise with committees, building relationships with
those who craft legislation and conduct hearings. The
Army could improve its role in the policy process, by
encouraging officers and senior leaders to cultivate
long-term relationships with members of Congress
and professional staffers who understand the Army’s
message and support the path it has chosen. Policymakers require knowledge and understanding of the
message, best articulated by talented Army leadership
and cultivated through long-term relationships with
those who will one day lead the Army. Deeper relationships and an understanding of the Army’s narrative at the Capitol will help the Army’s message to
naturally trickle down to the American public.
5. Continue Implementation of Talent Management Practices. The Army should continue looking
inward to manage talent from the point of accessions
to senior officer levels to create a culture that allows
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for different ideas, innovation, and adaptation. The
Army should focus on placing the right talent at the
right place at the right time. Some talent management
policies are being piloted and show great promise for
increasing officer satisfaction, assignment productivity, and meeting Army requirements. Several senior
participants at the conference voiced support for talent management and offered assistance in educating
senior leaders on these policies. The momentum of
support is steadily growing in favor of talent management; the Army should not waste this opportunity to
adopt policies that will ultimately uncover more talent in the Army, place that talent in more productive
assignments, and increase retention of the talent the
Army needs.
These talent management policies can help create succession plans that ensure the right leaders are
available to fill vacancies and to keep leaders in the
right jobs long enough to assess, implement, and execute policies. Moreover, limiting churn of senior leaders develops a depth of understanding on the business
side of the Army.
Finally, talent management policies can help overcome resistance to change. The reliance on “thinking
teams,” like Commander’s Action Groups and Commander’s Initiatives Groups, could be interpreted
by some that senior leaders lack trust in their staff
to think critically. Creating teams of diverse skills,
backgrounds, experiences, and education requires
further understanding and control of talent. This will
help guarantee that teams are not built to reinforce a
commander’s way of thinking.
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KEYNOTE ADDRESSES
Opening Keynote on Sunday, June 1, 2014
Senator Jack Reed, Senior Senator from Rhode
Island
Lunch Keynote on Monday, June 2, 2014
Brigadier General (Ret.) Huba Wass de Czege,
Independent Scholar of Military Theory
and Practice
Dinner Keynote on Monday, June 2, 2014
Dr. Ashton Carter, Former Deputy Secretary
of Defense
Breakfast Keynote on Tuesday, June 3, 2014
Major General H. R. McMaster, Commanding
General,
U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence
Closing Keynote on Tuesday, June 3, 2014
General Charles Jacoby, Jr., Commander,
United States Northern Command
General Vincent Brooks, Commanding General,
U.S. Army Pacific
Moderator: Colonel Suzanne Nielsen, Professor and
Deputy Head,
Department of Social Sciences, USMA
Discussion:
The five keynote addresses and discussions were
an integral part of the Senior Conference and drew on
a variety of perspectives, skill sets, and experiences.
The speakers sought to connect the domestic political
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and economic environment to the strategic landscape,
providing insights in a number of areas including
readiness and technology. While there was some disagreement on the force structure and size necessary
for future engagements, the keynote speakers generally agreed on two points: 1) war is a human phenomenon; and 2) well-trained soldiers are indispensible to
our national security strategy.
The domestic political context profoundly shapes
the strategic environment. The public is willing to
support its military, but that willingness is not limitless. In a democracy, strategy is shaped by the people’s
shared view of the world, which is grounded in both
logic and emotion. Specifically, the current political
environment and the diminishing public support for
boundless military intervention and use of conventional methods pose difficulties for moving forward.
Americans are less inclined to engage large numbers
of forces overseas and risk the lives of service members for unspecified time periods, dollar amounts, and
purposes. Additionally, as concern for rising income
inequality across the United States increases, so too
does public reluctance to devote federal spending to
another war effort when that money could be used to
fund domestic programs.
In the current budget environment, it is almost impossible to make sound strategic choices. As a result
of budget stringencies, jointness—the capacity of different services to operate together—has declined, as
have civil-military relations. Army professionals have
had an increasingly hard time explaining the risks associated with various cuts. Instead, senior leaders are
left making hard choices among suboptimal strategic
options. In making these choices, Army leaders should
prioritize readiness; in the absence of a better idea,

27

they should train and equip the force. They should
then maintain the Army’s competitive advantages:
the all-volunteer force, jointness, officer education,
fighting forward by means of the regional combatant
commands, and the industrial base.
Public opinion and willingness to spend have implications in the debate over force size, structure, and
readiness. Robust defense spending today may help
the budget in the future. This is because an upfront
investment in the size and readiness of our fighting
force may help decrease costs on the back end. This is
best understood when taking into account the importance of velocity. In the face of a conflict with a future
adversary, the United States must be able to respond
quickly and with overwhelming force to eliminate any
prospect for continuation or escalation of the conflict.
The justification for a high level of readiness is that the
cost of having a protracted land war in terms of blood
and treasure is out of the question both economically
and with respect to domestic will.
Many are now concerned about a “hollow force,”
but we should remember that hollowness is not only
a matter of training and equipment. The most hollow
unit is a unit without a mission. Even if a unit without
a mission has all of its hardware, it will be listless, ineffective, and difficult to lead. Even units that are not
fully ready by some measures may be extremely effective forces for theater security cooperation missions.
The Army should be proactive in offering capabilities
to end users as part of a joint, interagency team, to
include civil affairs, engineers, and other elements
within the Army that could otherwise be overlooked.
The Army should seek to restore a sense of common purpose among all components of the Total
Force. Reserve and active units should be incorporated into a shared mission. The choice between hav28

ing a deeper bench of reserve forces or a ready force
may be a false one. We must keep calling for a Total
Force application. Active and reserve components can
build trust by continuing to engage one another and
acknowledging that the Total Force works best when
each component complements the other.
Of course, the emphasis on the readiness debate
may be a fruitless endeavor if strategic thinking about
war is more important than robust capacity to wage
war. The United States will have the Army its citizens
are willing to pay for. It is the responsibility of leaders
in the U.S. military to do the best with the resources
they are given, which requires thinking clearly about
future wars.
Faulty thinking about grand strategy, concepts
of military power, and means of execution has led to
long and inconclusive military interventions despite
the reigning logic appearing to predict quick and decisive success. Without serious attention to reforming this consensus thinking, not only will the Army’s
relevance be consistently discounted by senior decisionmakers, but young men and women will continue
to be killed and maimed in elective enterprises that
sound thinking would have either put off or substantially revised in concept. Faulty strategic reasoning
also discounts the dangers that could arise from potential conflict among (or between) great powers.
If the United States thinks about war correctly,
a reduction in force will not materially weaken U.S.
military power. Dividing military power into its domains—land, sea, and air—is a misleading foundation
for formulating military strategy. It is better to begin
from the four essential functions of military power:
deterrence, defense, enforcement (attack), and pacification. The Army plays a crucial role in each of the
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four functions of military power. If the Army (or any
of the other services) is disproportionately cut, U.S.
military power will decline. As General Omar Bradley
said, “American armed strength is only as strong as
the combat capabilities of its weakest service.”
U.S. strategists must remember that war is a human phenomenon. The object of war is to alter the enemy’s will and capacity to wage war. A strategy that
aims at only one of these goals—by excessive reliance
on technology, and the corollary assumption that distant attacks weaken rather than strengthen resolve—
will not succeed. The central mistake in U.S. leaders’
understanding of war has to do with excessive faith
in technology. We assume that wars can be won from
the sea, air, and cyber domains, where U.S. technological and scientific advantages over other nations are
most evident. This is war as we would like it to be, not
as it is.
War involves continued interaction with the enemy; it should be thought of as a strategic game rather
than an interaction controlled by one side. Every technological advance can be countered by the enemy.
For every Humvee, there is an IED. American-trained
foreign forces will not always operate in American
interests. Allies, like enemies, adapt and change over
time. Because war is human and characterized by constant adaptation and change, forces “on the scene” are
more valuable than forces “over the horizon.” U.S.
land forces cannot effectively shape foreign environments unless they are stationed abroad. Land forces
cannot be dismantled and rebuilt without significant
cost and risk. It takes time to build an effective leader
of soldiers—more time than it takes to construct a ship
or plane. The last dime allocated in the defense budget
should be spent educating soldiers.
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SESSION 1:
PRESERVING U.S. INFLUENCE IN AN
UNCERTAIN, COMPLEX GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT
Panelists:
Dr. Nora Bensahel, Senior Fellow and Co-Director of
the Responsible Defense Program at the Center for a
New American Security
Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, President of the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
Dr. Terrence Kelly, Director of Strategy and
Resources at the Rand Arroyo Center
Dr. Conrad Crane, Chief of Historical Services
for the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center
Moderator:
Dr. Scott Silverstone, Professor of International
Relations, Department of Social Sciences, United
State Military Academy (USMA)
Guiding Questions:
What are the most significant threats to U.S. national
security?
How does Landpower address these significant
threats?
What lessons can the nation learn from historical responses to unforeseen threats?
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Discussion:
The first session explored the current strategic landscape, which is rather uncertain. As the United States
and its military move away from the past 13 years of
war, there is little consensus on future threats and
necessary capabilities. While those wars are winding
down (or were at the time of the conference, but not
at the time of this report), threats still exist. Discussion
centered on three areas of risk: geographic, temporal,
and scope of capabilities. In navigating these risks, the
Army must also deal with four challenges: 1) a shrinking overseas footprint, 2) an internal schism between
the active force and the National Guard, 3) the lack of
a coherent message with which to justify the Army’s
necessity to Congress and the public, and 4) the widespread belief in the ability of the Army to regenerate
quickly with low monetary and human cost.
The United States faces geographic risk as it balances to Asia, focuses on the Middle East, and places less
priority on other regions. In a world characterized by
continued instability in failed states, nuclear proliferation, and civil conflict in places such as Syria, the United States must ask itself how much chaos it is willing
to accept and where. As it prioritizes certain regions, it
faces missed opportunities in other countries that receive minimal attention and support. Moreover, three
revisionist powers—Russia, China, and Iran—are
dissatisfied with the existing status quo and appear
willing to use low-level force to disrupt the current
order. These states, and others, feel threatened by U.S.
force protection and are developing “keep out” zones
that will make projection of forces into their spheres of
influence increasingly difficult. The instability in the
Middle East, the rise of China, Iran, and Russia, and

32

America’s inability to fully focus on any specific region creates geographic risk as the United States cedes
influence in certain spheres to maintain it in others
where access is no longer assured.
The second risk is temporal: the United States
seems willing to assume more risk in the next 5 years
than in year 6 and beyond. Faced with concerns about
future capabilities, it is poised to sacrifice current and
near-term readiness to prepare for long-term threats.
The “democratization of destruction” resulting from
continued nuclear proliferation, new technologies, and
the loss of superiority in precision warfare means that
America cannot assume technological supremacy. The
scarce allocation of resources within the United States
military means that cutting too much in the wrong
place will make it difficult for the DoD and Army to
react quickly to various threats; as a result, the United
States may not respond in time to emerging threats
throughout the world.
The third risk involves capabilities. The American
budgetary crisis has affected research and development funds negatively, limiting potential growth
while the rest of the world, the revisionist powers in
particular, catches up. Coupled with the disarmament
of American allies, this decrease in capabilities leads
to a widening gap between U.S. strategic objectives
and the means by which it deals with them. As such,
the United States continues to accumulate strategic
risk without the resources to counter them. Because of
the geographic risk and the need to maintain technological superiority, it is imperative that U.S. partners
maintain their capabilities, which are vital to countering various strategic threats.
Managing these three risks requires a broad U.S.
strategy that seeks to prevent international aggression.
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Such a strategy would have the following characteristics. First, the United States must help create a stable
international environment that makes escalation of
conflicts less likely. Political leaders must have policy
options and responses that do not escalate crises, but
seek to mitigate them through diplomacy. Second, an
improved strategy bolsters the defensive capabilities
of our partners, both in the diplomatic/political and
military realms. Because the most likely conflicts affecting U.S. national interests will be ground conflicts
involving allies, the United States needs to work closely with those countries to develop their land capabilities even as they disarm. Third, senior leaders and key
thinkers need to ask the right questions. Perhaps the
most important is, “How does the United States maximize its interests given its capabilities?” Leveraging
continued advantages in the technological realm will
be important in this regard, especially as the United
States faces a new form of a standoff strike: cyber. To
take advantage of our current position, the United
States must retain a full array of military options because regenerating force structure and technology in
a timely manner will be difficult. Justifying this large
force is difficult when it is seldom used. However,
having a force ready to face the inevitable surprise is
vital to securing national interests.
This changing risk profile gives rise to four challenges for the Army. First, the Army will become a
U.S.-based garrison force with the smallest overseas
footprint since World War II. It will take longer to
project force abroad, and the force projection will
be limited as revisionist powers and nonstate actors
continue to grow their force size. Second, the Army
must work to heal and repair the internal rift between
active duty Army and the Reserve and Guard com-
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ponents created by recent capabilities debates. Third,
while the Army focuses internally, it must also find
a method to convey its message to Congress and the
American public more clearly. The Army must advocate for its role in the face of these various challenges
and the broad strategy of this administration to those
in Congress. Finally, the Army must consider the issues of reversibility of the impending drawdown and
the future regeneration of the force. The current view
is that manpower as a capability is easier to replace
than technology and equipment, hinting at an inclination toward increased personnel cuts.
The Army mitigates these risks if it recognizes that
irregular warfare is here to stay. This includes knowing how to wage it and how to fight it. The Army
must be prepared to deal with irregular warfare while
preparing for Phase III: Dominate operations to help
deter large threats. The Army must also consider
cross-domain warfare, under which artillery (broadly
conceived) may be a key area of development during
the next 10 years due to its force projection capabilities and effectiveness in a Phase III conflict. Finally,
the Army must learn how to work within the domestic
political realm. The inability to articulate its contributions to Congress and the public, while the Navy and
Air Force succeed at that same skill, makes the Army
a loser in the funding and personnel debate every time
it occurs. Adjusting its domestic strategy, tied with
preparing for both irregular and Phase III conflicts,
ensures the Army can face strategic risks.
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SESSION 2:
UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXT OF THE
UPCOMING ARMY TRANSITION
Panelists:
Brigadier General (Ret.) Mike Meese, Chief Operating Officer at the American Armed Forces Mutual
Aid Association (AAFMAA)
Mr. Todd Harrison, Senior Fellow,
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
Ms. Mackenzie Eaglen, Resident Fellow at the
Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies
Mr. Jeff Bialos, Executive Director of the Program on
Transatlantic Security and Industry at the Center for
Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies
Moderator: Dr. Steven Bloom, Assistant Professor,
Department of Social Sciences, USMA
Guiding Questions:
What is the historic pattern of Army transition
periods?
How has the Army dealt with reduced budgets in
the past?
What are the current states of Department of
Defense and Army budgets?
What is the congressional approach to funding the
Department of Defense?
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Discussion:
Session 2 focused on understanding the context of
the impending Army transition by looking at past transitions, present conditions, and suggestions for how to
navigate the inevitable change successfully. The Army
has plenty of experience with downsizing, and history
tends to repeat itself. The Army has gone through periods of downsizing and transition before. The political
and budgetary climate does not bode well for future
strategic planning, but the Army is still quite capable
of fielding an exemplary force and should not claim
otherwise. However, the Army must make clear that
the concept of reversibility, that the Army can quickly
and easily regenerate when faced with conflict, is a
myth. While the Army can rebuild itself in times of
need, the cost will be high in terms of both blood and
treasure. In considering the drawdown, the Army will
be confronted with tradeoffs between technology and
personnel. While the current zeitgeist seems to favor
technology, the core strength of the Army is its people
and that should not be sacrificed for the latest gadgets.
One way to understand the current Army transition is to review the lessons from previous drawdowns. By looking at the Army’s past, four tendencies
emerge. First, while the Army’s emphasis is on people,
those people tend to be traded off for everything else,
especially modernization of weapons systems. In the
past, the Army has eventually recognized that, while
the quantity of personnel is very expensive, the quality of those people is vital. Therefore, it is especially
important for the Army to concentrate on investing
in leader development programs and entitlement reforms during a drawdown. Second, the Army tends to
opt for a larger expansible infrastructure, rather than
smaller more robust units. Then, when it is directed
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to downsize it hollows those structures, which can
lead to a “hollow Army.” Effective incorporation of
the Reserve and National Guard components is imperative to mitigate this hollowing. Third, it is important to make decisions about transition with a holistic
approach. Often there is too strong an emphasis on
equity across the Army’s branches and units instead
of wholesale reductions of those units that contribute
least to effectiveness. The Army tends to make salami
slice cuts, in which no real decisions are required, instead of making tough decisions and standing behind
these decisions. Finally, the Army tends to confuse
Army doctrine with national doctrine. Amid budget
reductions, the Army tends to create its own, smaller
version of national strategy, instead of concentrating
on its most effective contributions to the Joint Force.
Another key point of study is the domestic political
climate. In austere times, the budget is a critical component for any discussion of the Army’s transition. As
such, careful attention must be paid to the political terrain. Since 2010, the President has routinely requested
spending above the base budget while Congress continues to cut the budget. This results in massive uncertainty due to a growing gap between what the President requests and what is allocated by Congress. For
example, in 2010, the gap equaled $6 billion. By 2013,
this gap had mushroomed to $37 billion. The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) effectively established
budget caps and brought conclusion to the U.S. debt
ceiling crisis, which had threatened to lead the country into default of its debts. If Congress exceeds the
budget cap, which it did in 2013, it triggers sequestration, a compulsory enforcement mechanism affecting
government spending across the board. In response,
Congress raised the cap and proposed $1.2 trillion in
budget cuts to be spread over 9 years, thereby reduc39

ing much of the gap in the out years. The President’s
spending request for 2015 equals the budget cap level,
but if in 2016 the President’s request exceeds the cap,
it will trigger sequestration once again.
Cycles in the defense budget are nothing new. In
the drawdown of forces following the Cold War, Congress appropriated funds below what were requested
after considering the unrealistic projected growth in
a time of decline. What is unique to this drawdown
is the size of the force. In previous drawdowns the
military declined by one-third or more; the size of the
force is decreasing while the defense budget continues
to grow. One reason for the escalating defense budget
is the cost of acquisition programs that fail to field any
systems. Another explanation centers on costs per person. In order to reach the one-third drawdown benchmark, the budget is being cut alongside the number
of forces. There will most likely be more cuts in the
future and the possibility of a projected force smaller
than 420,000.
While this drawdown may be comparable to those
in the past based off of the number of personnel cuts,
it will feel much worse because of the political atmosphere. Discussions regarding budget cuts tend to
focus on two different trains of thought: readiness is
too low due to the cuts and more is not always better.
There is currently a lack of awareness in Washington,
DC, that sequestration is unlike other budget cuts, and
therefore there has been minimal reprieve. Politicians
are quick to congratulate themselves for passing the
BCA and think they have saved the military. However, subsequent deals provide little relief because the
end state will not change in the near term. Members
of Congress are still driving toward the same goals.
For example, one participant noted that the Chairman
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of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) has
been pushing House leadership to pay attention to the
effects of sequestration on the military. HASC even offered the House insight into secret briefings, but only
one member of Congress showed up for the briefing.
Additionally, HASC is only given 60 seconds to address a bill. While anecdotal, these examples provide
a sense of the political climate today. The reality is that
most members of Congress will not lose an election
over the defense budget. Ultimately, we have dialed
down strategy and readiness of our military forces
while dialing up risk.
Regardless of the difficulties posed by the austerity
measures, the Army will continue to operate at a tempo necessitating and guaranteeing a robust budget.
The Army should be able to field a capable fighting
force within the Army’s budgetary allocations and it
is culpable if it cannot field this force. However, some
participants felt that the Army needs to decide on its
core mission and focus on it. Some believe that the
Army must adapt its mindset in order to stay relevant
and there is risk of being institutionally resistant to
change. Some argue that technology, e.g., cyber, unmanned aerial vehicles, etc., has replaced much of the
need for a large standing Army. Others feel that the
strength of the Army is its people, and that we should
not sacrifice people for technology.
The Army has spent the last 13 years fighting lowintensity conflicts. It must now decide if this is the Army’s strength. The Army must also consider whether
it is still prepared to fight large scale wars and if this
is even likely. Most threats will remain low-intensity
type threats, e.g., humanitarian missions, counterterrorism, proxy wars, etc. The only peer competitor the
United States faces is China, and it is unrealistic to
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see high-intensity conflict with them. Given this, the
Army might consider allocating heavy units to the Reserve while also establishing a command specifically
focused on low-intensity warfare.
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SESSION 3:
THE ARMY AS PART OF THE JOINT,
INTERAGENCY, AND
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TEAM
Panelists:
Lieutenant General Edward Cardon, Commander,
U.S. Army Cyber Command
Dr. Kori Schake, Research Fellow,
Hoover Institution, Stanford University
Brigadier General Guy Cosentino, Commandant of
the National War College
Lieutenant General Charles Cleveland, Commander,
United States Army Special Operations Command
Moderator:
Colonel Jonalan Brickey, Research Fellow at the
Combating Terrorism Center, USMA
Guiding Questions:
What do transnational national security challenges,
such as terrorism and conflict in cyberspace, imply
about the Army’s needed capabilities?
What are the strategic capabilities and joint force enablers provided by the Army?
How can the Army improve its integration with other instruments of national power, as well as other
military services, host nations, allies, and international organizations?
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Discussion:
Panelists in this session discussed the Army in the
joint environment and the capabilities the service provides to the joint and interagency force. As the Army
moves through this period of downsizing, it must
seek to operate within an integrated environment, relying on partners and allies. The difficulty here is that
other services and allies are starting to abandon the
joint concept. Despite this resistance, the Army must
continue to develop integrated, joint options. Two key
areas for such development include the cyber domain
and special operations. However, as the Army continues to pursue the joint environment, it can lose focus
on its key strength: soldiers.
The other services have defected from the concept
of jointness with the Army. They have walked away
from it intellectually and programmatically, as evident in a variety of cuts. Some participants felt that the
Marines never believed in jointness except when the
Army provided them support capabilities for the duration. The Army cannot walk away and must be the
joint force by supplying the underlying infrastructure
for land-based strategies such as providing Patriot
missile defense, helicopters, engineers, special ops,
signal, logistics, intelligence, and medical support. For
years, the Army filled that niche but never received
credit due to failures to communicate success to policymakers and political leadership. Some argue that
instead of accepting cuts and moving forward, the
Army must message its role within the joint force and
preserve its vital role by fighting every cut. Without
the Army, competitors will soon catch up to American defense strengths. At that point, it will be too late
to support the joint force properly. Others think the
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Army should be willing to compromise as a means of
controlling the extent and locations of budget cuts.
Within the joint force, the Army provides two
key areas for integration. The first is within the cyber
realm. Constant daily threats give us real-time contact
every day on the virtual frontline, thereby driving adaptation and evolution. Attacks are much easier now
than ever before, and online hacking applications no
longer limit attacks to the state actors. Strategically,
the Chinese hack in order to steal from us. We need to
think about how to combat this strategy because commercial theft threatens our national economic assets. It
is particularly important to protect Silicon Valley because the military cannot compete on the same scale
of technological innovation with the private sector.
Private sector innovation must be a national priority
as it is an essential asset underpinning our economy,
highly valuable, and susceptible to Internet theft.
One challenge is that the Army’s authority in cyber defense only extends to the .mil domain. Recent
reports sparked debate over the primacy of military
duties and the public’s rights to privacy that has
stopped progress of discussion of integration and coordination. There needs to be an integration of private,
commercial, government, and military defenses in the
cyber realm, and the infrastructure for that does not
exist yet. This can be an Army focus because many of
the effects are felt within the land domain.
The best means of improving the Army’s role within
the cyber sphere is to assess, train, manage, and retain
good people. Managing talented cyber professionals
requires a new approach to developing and managing
those who understand the changing domain and how
to best integrate across defense, private, public, and
government sectors.
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The second area of integration involves special
operations forces (SOF). The past 13 years saw a supportive relationship between conventional and SOF
forces that must be solidified through doctrine. SOF
and the Army operate together but use distinct doctrines that limit planning and communication. In 2012,
Army special operations doctrine added two “exquisite capabilities”: surgical strike and clandestine kill/
capture. At the same time, the Army integrated special
operations as a core competency allowing the Army to
claim the world’s finest irregular warfare force. This
move, however, requires the Army shift its own doctrine and phasing model to fit different types of war.
The current model of Phase 0 through 5 wars does not
fit irregular models and limits the ability of the Army
to claim special operations as part of its narrative. By
incorporating SOF into conventional structures and
combining doctrine, the Army can better integrate
and increase its value to the nation.
Developing a force that provides “strategic Landpower” requires understanding that the Army must
dominate on land, win wars, and prevail in the human
domain. Given density of populations, Landpower is
accruing a heightened strategic quality. After all, land
presence is still nonsubstitutable. Land and the need
to secure it will not disappear. The Army must continue to demonstrate its successes in the joint environment to politicians and the public alike. Moreover, it
must manage its talent in ways that provide the nation the best force possible in the human, land, and
cyber domains.
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SESSION 4:
TOWARD THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE:
PREVENT, SHAPE, AND WIN
Panelists:
Dr. Alison Kaufman, Senior Research Scientist,
China Studies Division, CNA Corporation
Dr. Barry Posen, Ford International Professor of
Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
Dr. Mike O’Hanlon, Director of Research, Foreign
Policy Program, Brookings Institution
Lieutenant Colonel Chris Danbeck, Commander’s
Initiatives Group, 1st Infantry Division
Mr. Jim Hake, Founder and Chief Executive Officer,
Spirit of America
Moderator:
Lieutenant Colonel (P) Tania Chacho, Academy Professor and Director of Comparative Politics, Department of Social Sciences, USMA
Guiding Questions:
What capabilities does the Army need to prevent
and shape?
How should the Army balance investments among
personnel, operational readiness, force modernization, and research?
How should the Army approach innovation and adaptation to better meet the demands of preventing
and shaping?
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Discussion:
In this session, panelists and participants explored
future capabilities and means of achieving those needs
through innovation and adaptation. The rapidly
changing security environment, regional power shifts,
and internal political turmoil experienced in Asia pose
both challenges and opportunities for the U.S. Army
moving forward. In looking to the future, the Army
must be prepared to use nontraditional methods to
achieve its mission. Regionally aligned forces and private sector partnerships offer possible solutions, but
their costs must also be carefully considered before
making wholesale changes to Army functionality.
The Asian security environment is changing rapidly and is undergoing regional power shifts. The recent U.S. rebalance is one factor of change, but it is not
universally viewed in a positive manner. While most
countries in the region support the rebalance, some
question whether the United States has the capacity
and political will to implement and sustain it. China,
on the other hand, views the rebalance as damaging
to regional security, and hopes it will not occur. Many
Asian countries are looking to build up new capabilities in order to contend with nontraditional security
threats in the region. In addition, countries such as
Thailand and Myanmar (Burma) are experiencing internal political change that has security ramifications
beyond their borders.
Increasingly, Asian countries perceive their greatest threats to be maritime-related and are therefore rethinking the role of ground forces, posing a challenge
for the U.S. Army to rethink its role in the region.
While Asian nations grapple with this issue, they still
desire an American presence. Even so, the United
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States must realize that it is not the only partner in the
area. Increasingly, the Army will have to compete to be
the partner of choice, be perceptive of allies’ needs as
cooperative relations and expectations change, invest
in building regional expertise, and embrace new and
rapidly emerging partners in the region. These challenges are further complicated by the fact that China
is an appealing economic and/or security partner to
many countries in the region.
As the United States contends with the rapidly
changing strategic environment in Asia, it must also
behave with more restraint while striving to achieve
its broader objectives in the region. More specifically,
the United States must work with allies to prevent the
rise of a hegemon in Asia, defend against terrorists
who possess global reach, and manage the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Given the rapidly changing strategic environment,
threats in the region, and the resource constraints the
nation faces, the Army must reevaluate and conceptualize its role moving forward. Some have argued
for fewer ground troops (drawdown to 20 brigades),
a larger Navy, and more Special Forces and intelligence gathering capabilities. While the easy path for
the Army might be to pursue a bit of everything, the
Army is not at its best when it tries to do too much.
Some felt that he Army should take its own version of
an appetite suppressant when considering the use of
military power. In many ways the Army is pursuing
the same path that it followed in the post-Vietnam era,
“a go anywhere Army.” The Army should focus its
efforts instead on mid-to-high intensity combat as its
core competency. This requires a new framework for
a sizing force structure for the Army of 1+2, in which
“1” is a major regional war or major theater of war and
“2” consists of smaller missions.
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Globally, there are 4 scenarios that the Army must
seriously consider:
1. If a Middle East Peace Agreement is executed,
it would require a U.S.-led stabilization force (1-2 Brigade commitment for the foreseeable future);
2. If negotiation with Iran fails and the United
States determines to strike Iranian nuclear facilities,
the United States would need to secure Persian Gulf
oil and battalions would need to be centrally placed in
the Arabian Peninsula to reassure allies in the region
and provide security immediately after a strike;
3. If a conflict develops between India and Pakistan, a negotiated deal would require U.S. presence to
provide stability in the region; and,
4. Various scenarios that lead to a catastrophic natural disaster would require more than a few thousand
American troops to provide humanitarian relief.
While none of these scenarios are guaranteed to
happen, they represent the threats the Army must be
prepared to confront. Planning for just one of these
scenarios is insufficient. It is important the Army be
sizable enough to handle 1+2 wars
Regionally aligned forces (RAF) foster potential
opportunities for the future of the Army. More specifically, from a tactical perspective, the RAF model
motivates soldiers immensely in an uncertain future
in which opportunities for deployment are appearing
to dwindle. Operationally, RAF units create adaptive leaders and inspire them to learn about cultures
and languages. This allows the Army to continue to
prevent conflict and shape environments, while also
maintaining its global relevance and responsiveness.
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In order to cope with the instability of resource
constraints and the future of the Army’s sizing force
structure, private sector companies can also be leveraged. Spirit of America, a privately funded 503c
nongovernment organization, provides direct assistance to U.S. missions abroad under the guidance of
three principles: 1) decentralization (Spirit of America
works side by side with those deployed), 2) private
funding (funding comes from individuals, foundations and businesses), and 3) lack of neutrality. The
benefit of these types of public/private partnerships
derives from the organization’s ability to act with
speed and flexibility and helps connect the 99 percent
of Americans who do not serve with the 1 percent that
do. This helps to make the American people partners
in U.S. missions.
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SESSION 5:
PARADIGM SHIFT: HOW MUST THE ARMY
CHANGE FOR THE FUTURE?
Panelists:
Colonel (Ret.) Jack Jacobs, Robert F. McDermott
Chair in Humanities & Public Affairs, Department
of Social Sciences, USMA
Brigadier General John Ferrari, Military Deputy,
Program Analysis and Evaluation
Lieutenant Colonel David Lyle, Director of the
Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis, Department of Social Sciences, USMA
Dr. Leonard Wong, Research Professor of Military
Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College
Moderator:
Colonel Jeffrey Peterson, Academy Professor and
Director of Economics, Department of Social Sciences, USMA
Guiding Questions:
How do we rethink and redesign our approaches to
U.S. Army material and human capital development
in light of current and future strategic imperatives?
How should the Army provide incentives for innovation and creative thinking that leads to agile and
adaptive organizations?
What cultural norms and world views, if any, are
hindering change and increased productivity?
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Discussion:
The final session explored a range of internal
changes the U.S. Army needs to make regardless of
threats emerging in the domestic and global environment. One of biggest, yet least discussed, threats is internal and centers on the Army’s inability to adapt to
a changing world. While it is true that some of this is
engrained in the organizational culture due to self-selection of senior leadership, there are changes that can
be made to improve the management of the Army’s
vast trove of talent.
The first problem is that, when confronted with
uncertainty, the Army tends not to take the long view
in terms of both personnel and strategy. In the absence
of a clear national security strategy, it is left with a
series of fragmented policies and short-term actions.
These short-term policies will have long-term consequences. The long-term result of current personnel
decisions will be an Army without middle managers
(E7s and O4s).
Second, the Army strategy often seems based on
what it is capable of doing, rather than what it should
be doing. The Army examines its capabilities and then
asks what missions it can execute to use these capabilities. Army policies often seem focused on execution
but not consolidation. The organization often forgets
that it always takes more resources to hold a hill than
to take that same hill. This is not dissimilar from other
fields. Most businesses fail in the first year because
it is easier to start a business than to keep it running
successfully over time.
Third, the Army must not let itself become overly
bureaucratic. Recent history indicates that drawdowns
tend to result in a broken Army. This is because exces-
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sive bureaucracy tends to dominate. In the 1990s, the
senior leadership gutted the officer corps, leaving behind a bureaucracy concerned more with protecting
its own interests than strengthening brigade combat
teams. The lesson learned with this experience was to
bypass bureaucracies rather than work within them.
The Army may be getting itself into a similar situation
today: the requirements, acquisitions, and resourcing
processes drive decisionmaking. To improve efficiency, the Army must effectively and efficiently blend its
operating force in the field with the generating force
in Washington.
To many, the acquisitions process is broken. The
length of the procurement cycle impedes innovation
and development. Despite this, because it wants to
project a positive image, some felt that the Army will
re-label abject failures in bureaucratic operations as
victories. For example, the bureaucracy initially opposed up-armoring vehicles to adapt to IEDs in the
field. As such, the mine-resistant armor protected program was actually a bureaucratic failure, not a success
story. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
educational programs are also slow to change. Only
by taking back the bureaucracies will the Army be
able to return to its core objective to “organize, train,
and equip soldiers to go to war.”
One way to mitigate these three problems is to
adapt during the drawdown. This seems unlikely,
though, in light of recent failures to change when
faced with existential threats. Given the tendency of
bureaucracy to entrench, some felt that it is not surprising that the Army has not yet adapted or evolved
its personnel or procurement systems to the major
shock of the September 11, 2001, attack and the advent
of global terrorism. There is increasing evidence that
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the Army should shift to a new paradigm to foster institutional agility. As Secretary Robert Gates said, we
need to break up the institutional concrete. The Army
must rethink the way it deals with personnel because
innovation and adaptability requires talent; the Army
needs to get the most out of the talent it has.
The U.S. Army Personnel Management System
has not changed since its creation in the 1950s. This
is affecting the Army’s ability to assign soldiers and
officers to jobs in which they are primed to excel. Being good out in the field may be the path to promotion, but once officers move to higher ranks, the skill
sets needed to succeed change. Instead of excelling at
taking hills, officers need management and business
acumen. Moreover, the Army’s evaluation system is
weak and unable to provide information necessary
for optimal matching of talents and assignments. The
typical officer evaluation report form offers no way to
capture relevant depth and breadth of human capital
in the dimensions needed to meet the demands of today’s Army. If the Army does not capture the necessary information, then it will not have the data needed
to make proper allocation decisions across functions,
branches, and regions of the world; it will fall short
of placing people in positions to capture their highest and best use value. Moreover, those officers who
do rise through the ranks have higher degrees from a
concentrated number of sources, specifically masters’
degrees from intermediate level education (ILE) or war
colleges, resulting in little diversity of experience, perspective, or background among general officers. This
syndrome tends to promote a group-think tendency
in most decisionmaking at senior levels. There is also
an over-reliance on replacement planning to backfill
the excessive churn among leadership positions at all
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ranks. The alternative would be true succession planning like that employed in the private sector. There
is much shorter average tenure in the Army than in
corporate leadership, and this undermines responsibility and accountability in job performance. This is
because subordinates know they do not have to adapt
to change when they can simply wait out the next
change of leadership.
The Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis (OEMA) designed and tested a new Army talent
matching program to put officers with broadly diversified skills into positions in which they can most contribute. The result is an efficient allocation of human
capital that moves the Army toward a better distribution of talent. The program addresses the four essentials in any human resources system: accession, development, retention, and employment. As an example,
OEMA created a portal called Green Pages, which was
built based on resumes and listed talents of participating officers. This information can be reviewed by
battalion commanders as they consider which officers
to select with the hope that these commanders will attempt to hunt for talent matches. The idea is that the
program forces leaders to really think about what they
need. This is a portal to match the supply of talent
with the demands of commanders’ needs in future officer talent. This allows for an efficient blending of the
operating force and the generating force. It should be
noted that, in testing the system, it was easier to elicit
talent data from the officers than candidate requirements the commands needing to fill open positions.
The hope is that personnel officers will become more
comfortable with the system over time.
Another approach to talent management is to drive
to career stakes in the ground at ILE and the war col-
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lege level. Officers will have to apply to get into ILE,
and then get immersed in a year-long rigorous course.
If the officer gets through, he/she will face an human
resources board that will become her talent manager/
promotion board going forward until the next rung is
reached. The same approach would apply at the war
college level as an officer moves upward from there
into senior leader ranks. Under this approach, education would be built upon a more rigorous professional
military education system.
There are innovative ideas, like talent management, to move the Army forward. What is impeding
the service from broader implementation of some of
these ideas? Research shows that senior leadership
within the U.S. Army characteristically is resistant to
change and adaptation. For example, a recent survey
showed that 50 percent of the soon-to-be strategic
leaders of the Army were uncomfortable with General Eric Shinseki’s shift to the objective force. Why
is it so hard for the military leadership to embrace
reform even in the face of pressures to adapt? Organizational behavior and psychological research suggests resistance to change by senior Army leaders is
a result of both nature and nurture of the individual
leaders themselves, including their personality, intelligence, and life experiences. On the nature side, research shows that openness of personality, capturing
intellectual curiosity, and willingness to change are
rooted in genetics and largely inherited. At the U.S.
Army War College, Army officers are below average
in openness relative to the population as a whole. Intelligence and productivity are also largely inherited,
and here Army officers are significantly higher than
the average in society. However, research shows the
smarter you are, the more you tend to defend your
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own position and the less you bend through reassessment. So, the personality traits of Army leaders generally promote complacent, conservative thinking. Their
high productivity and intelligence empower them to
rationalize but also to defend their entrenched positions effectively.
On the nurture side, research identifies the importance of career imprinting in influencing the behaviors
of career professionals, including in the profession of
arms. Imprinting relates to things that happen early in
a career that influence professionals disproportionately later in a career. The U.S. Army accentuates career
imprinting through regimentation and its strict chainof-command authority structure. The Army places junior officers through stretch training, and their demonstrated success then gets rewarded with promotions
which serve to imprint acceptable behavior.
So where does this leave us? Officers come into
the profession of arms less open to change but highly
motivated, with professional drive, strong intellect,
and routinely strong moral values. The Army then
socializes them, imprints its values, and sends them
off into first assignments where they get stretched,
then rewarded, resulting in a hardening of those imprints. They emerge as senior leaders, relatively homogeneous as a group by both nature and nurture.
As a result, the Army has little capacity for innovative, adaptive thinking in an ever changing world.
Acknowledging this tendency is the first step toward
positive change.
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